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Introduction 
The southeastern Afghanistan provinces of Khost, Paktika, and Paktya encompass a wide 
range of agro-ecological zones and once boasted a strong agriculture-export based economy 
(FAO, 2007). Agriculture remains at the center of a national economic recovery strategy. 
However, Soviet invasion, sporadic war and government collapse have left an agricultural 
landscape, infrastructure, and human capacity devastated from decades of fighting and neglect 
(Kock, Harder & Saisi, 2010). Irrigation systems were destroyed by the Soviets and many 
families fled their homes for refugee camps in Pakistan. Schools closed and generations of 
farmers and potential farmers were killed in conflicts, interrupting the intergenerational transfer 
of agricultural knowledge (Jurenas, 2001; Thomas & Ramzi, 2011).  
Since the start of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the United States military 
operation in Afghanistan which began on October 7, 2001(Global Security, 2002), has explored 
many options to address the crippled agricultural sector. U.S. policy objectives are presently 
focused on building Afghan confidence in their government. In rural areas, agriculture 
development was the face of this policy because this may have been the only government 
program or personnel with whom farmers interact (Groninger & Lasko, 2011). This support has 
taken many forms, including building community agriculture infrastructure, providing seed, 
fertilizer and equipment, and hiring agriculture trainers and extension personnel.  
Agriculture was at greater risk due to violence in the southeastern Afghanistan provinces 
of Khost, Paktika, and Paktya than many other areas, and developing sustainability was a serious 
concern (FAO, 2007). The strength of Afghan government institutions and relative stability of 
agricultural communities varied considerably at both provincial and district –levels. Overall, this 
region was considered violent even by Afghan standards (Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, 
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2011).  These conditions had significantly slowed, but certainly not stopped, agricultural 
development and reconstruction relative to many other portions of Afghanistan (Groninger & 
Lasko, 2011). Here, U.S. military Agribusiness Development Teams, USDA agriculture advisors 
and USAID field personnel worked both with the Afghan government’s offices of the Director of 
Agriculture Irrigation and Livestock (DAIL) within each province and behind the scenes to 
support the development of an agriculture infrastructure in locations or capacities where the 
DAIL was not functioning  (Groninger & Ruffner, 2010).  
Need for the study 
Due to evolving policy, coupled with disappointing results from other development 
approaches through the first several years of OEF, U.S. civilian and military personnel in the 
region had increasingly focused on agriculture training, including education and extension 
programs, to address policy objectives that would ensure sustainability in the agriculture industry 
(Kock, et al., 2010).  In a recent study (Kock & Turnbull, 2011), Afghan farm store owners 
perceived extension education and services to be essential. 
Similarly, the Afghan government was in the process of formalizing a program to 
increase extension capacity. These efforts had been managed from Kabul with little input from 
the southeastern provinces, which remained relatively isolated from the central government in 
terms of programmatic guidance or resources (FAO, 2007).  At that time, several institutions 
carried out agriculture extension functions with limited programmatic evaluation. U.S. 
agriculture support personnel needed to assess the current extension efforts if they were to 
improve the transfer of the agricultural knowledge needed in re-establishing sustainable 
agricultural systems in a persistently insecure area.
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Theoretical/Conceptual Framework 
This project established a theoretical framework by identifying five areas of concern in 
Afghan extension efforts. By employing three constructs from a train-the-trainer agricultural 
education program in Egypt (Barrick, Samy, Gunderson & Thoron, 2009), researchers in the 
project proposed an initial theoretical model; which included assessment, content and process. 
Using qualitative case study methodology to develop grounded theory (Creswell, 1998), they 
added two areas identifying unique constraints under which agricultural extension must take 
place in Afghanistan; these included the two constructs of security and access, and provincial 
diversity (Figure 1).  
 
FIGURE 1.  Conceptual Framework of Train-the-Trainer Model for  
   Agricultural Extension in Afghanistan. 
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Sustainable & Efficient Ag Extension Efforts in Afghanistan 
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Assessment allows responsiveness to industry needs, preparation of trainees to master 
those skills deemed essential for success, and skill-gap analysis which helps identify needed 
changes in the curricula. Content addresses a comprehensive curriculum through which trainees 
may cultivate competence in agricultural technical skills, decision making skills, and leadership 
and personal skills. The process component not only provides trainees with learning strategies, 
but also provides technical content and training methods needed in this type of a train-the-trainer 
program for agricultural extension (Barrick, et al., 2009). 
Security and Access issues were identified in the data as drivers of the type of content 
addressed and the vehicle for process in and assessment of the program.  Provincial Diversity 
issues called for flexibility in the delivery of extension education, and impacted decisions in the 
other four components of the model.  
 
Purpose/Objectives 
The purpose of this study was to provide an evaluation of agriculture extension in the 
southeastern Afghanistan provinces of Khost, Paktika, and Paktya, utilizing the proposed model 
for Afghan extension (see Figure 1) by obtaining input from U.S. personnel supporting extension 
in the war theatre of Afghanistan. Insights gained from this study were intended to guide future 
activities and establish sustainable agricultural systems. The specific objectives of the study were 
to establish: 
1. How assessment used industry needs to guide trainee preparation by identifying gaps 
in trainees’ skill levels. 
2. The content needed in Afghan extension to ensure all needed skills are imparted to 
both trainers and trainees. 
3. The process components which would be effective in Afghan extension to accomplish 
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information dissemination. 
4. Identify additional components in an Afghan train-the-trainer program through the 
use of grounded theory. 
Methodology 
Base line assessment of agricultural extension efforts toward agriculture sustainability 
was conducted employing a qualitative case study methodology (Merriam, 1998; Yin, 1984). 
Open-ended interviews were conducted with eight individuals, who supported and facilitated 
extension efforts in Afghanistan, to assess the initial three areas of concern. Two additional areas 
of concern, security & access, and provincial diversity, were added as a result of the grounded 
theory developed through the study.  
Strauss and Corbin (1998) indicated grounded theory is “derived from the data, 
systematically gathered and analyzed through the research process” (p. 12). Data collection, 
analysis, and developing theory are comingled activities when using this methodology. The 
portion of the theoretical framework resulting from this study was not preconceived, but 
developed through the researchers’ desire to understand the respondents’ construction of reality 
in Afghan extension.  
Instrumentation 
Interview questions were developed utilizing information obtained from a literature 
review and first-hand knowledge of the researchers from extension efforts in Afghanistan. The 
initial questions were reviewed by a group of experts who had also conducted agricultural 
extension efforts in Afghanistan from 2005 to 2010. Existing questions were modified, and new 
questions added, before a final instrument was ready for use with the targeted population of 
United States agricultural extension personnel in Afghanistan. The final interview instrument 
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was validated by a panel of experts in Afghanistan (Wiersma, 1995) and used in open ended, 
qualitative semi-structured interviews with the selected participants. 
Population 
Respondents included five members of the Agribusiness Development Team (ADT) from 
the U.S. Oklahoma National Guard. In addition, interviewees included an agricultural advisor for 
the USDA, a general development officer for USAID and a forestry professor from (a U.S. 
University). Respondents (Table 1) were selected because of their service related to agricultural 
extension efforts in southeastern Afghanistan, and identified by a key informant who was an 
expert in Afghanistan agricultural extension. Respondents’ terms of service, as noted in Table 1, 
were typically less than one year. 
The interviews were conducted by one of the researchers on location in Afghanistan 
November 9 – December 10, 2010. Interviews were recorded using a microcassette voice 
recorder, and transcribed at a later date. After each formal interview, observations were made and 
recorded. Richard J. Lasko, USDA senior agriculture advisor who coordinated U.S. agriculture 
activity in the study areas of Khost, Paktika, and Paktya provinces, was then contacted and acted 
as key informant. The researcher was then directed to key participants in the project; who, in 
turn, referred others to create a more reliable interview atmosphere, making use of the snowball 
technique put forth by Patton (1990). One of the researchers in the project also provided data, 
based on Patton’s view that contextual observations cannot be made that preclude the presence of 
the observer, and that observations on how people organize their worlds and the meanings they 
attach to what goes on in the world would be limited. Interviews and researcher observation were 
therefore appropriate for addressing the study’s theoretical questions and analytical situations. 
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Table 1. Respondent Demographics 
Pseudonym Title Org. Gender Specialization In Afghanistan 
Patton 1
st
 Sgt. ADT Male Food Storage 1½ Months 
Smith Sgt. ADT Female Poultry 2 Months 
Kraft Specialist ADT Male Ag Ext/Equine 2 Months 
Amos Lt. Col. ADT Male 
Ag Ext/Soils, Hay, 
Greenhouses, Equine 
1½ Months 
Milner Sgt. ADT Female Ag Ext/Marketing 1½ Months 
Livingston Ag Advisor USDA Male 
NRCS/Ag Ext/Natl. 
Resources/Mgt. 
11 Months 
Alvin Dev. 
Officer 
USAID Male 
Ag NGOs in Egypt & 
Sudan – bees/wheat 
8 Months 
Granite Professor (a university) Male Forestry/Watershed 5+Years 
 
Prior to conducting interviews, written clearance was first obtained from Major James 
Kenit, of the U.S. Army Task Force Rakkasans, 187
th
 Infantry Regiment of the 101
st
 Airborne 
Division headquartered at Ft. Campbell, Kentucky. Human subjects clearance for this project 
was obtained through the Office of Research Development and Administration at (a U.S. 
University, a U.S. city) (Assurance # 00005334). Pseudonyms were assigned to each respondent 
to assure confidentiality. 
Results & Discussion 
Interviews of the eight individuals associated with the U.S. extension efforts in 
southeastern Afghanistan were transcribed, loaded into ATLAS.ti
©
 qualitative analysis software, 
coded, and analyzed following Miles and Huberman’s memoing and matrix techniques (1994). 
Through coding, themes emerged which explained the constructs targeted in the study’s first 
three objectives, and the two additional theories identified. 
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Constructs of the Initial Theoretical Model 
Assessment  
Respondents observed extension carried out by the Afghan government as primarily 
involving Afghan agents waiting for farmers to come into district offices for answers to farming 
problems and the distribution of goods and seeds. Afghan extension agents also lobbied the 
government on behalf of the farmers for equipment, heavy machinery, seed, fertilizer and other 
goods. Unfortunately, such services primarily represented those farmers in areas most accessible 
to Kabul, as the government was separated from other provinces due to geographic obstacles 
such as mountains, tribal diversity, and security issues.   
Informants reported Afghanistan’s government traditionally relied heavily on a Soviet-
influenced central planning model, but with no reliable means of ensuring that planned activities 
were actually taking place. They observed the only control the central government maintained 
was by funds. They were viewed as determining how all the money was to be spent in the 
provinces, but delivered very little money to the provinces beyond payroll for DAIL personnel. 
Respondents indicated the money they did deliver, many times, was lost to corruption. 
Sergeant Smith observed: “…the DAIL wants everything done here in Gardez at his compound, 
and have people come here instead of pushing it out to the more rural districts that need it.” 
The problem of corruption did not only lie with the government; respondents indicated 
that the corruption existed at all levels. Dr. Granite summed the situation in this way:  
Everybody up and down the line is trying to work the system and benefit themselves;  
they really don’t know what tomorrow is going to bring. It’s really a war time,  
every man for himself - every family for themselves, type of situation. 
Other provinces seemed to be working well, however, varying from one neighborhood to 
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the next, depending on a combination of events and forces. When describing the overall expected 
goals and outcomes of the Afghan government’s approach to extension, Dr. Granite explained 
there was some emphasis on education in a couple of the provinces, but not in all cases. He 
pointed to tremendous variability from one province to another as to what agents did and what 
they perceived the extension system to be. 
 American personnel, on the other hand, sought to make education the primary goal. As it 
was put by Lieutenant Colonel Amos: 
The primary goal of extension programs is basically an education issue. Getting  
the people educated on agriculture and agriculture programs.  Over the last 30 years, they 
lost a tremendous amount of agricultural knowledge. Instead of people growing up and 
learning how to raise animals and raise crops, they’ve been picking up weapons and 
fighting.  …Focus on the youth. Focus on the women. Focus on education… because it’s 
the one thing you can give them that can’t be taken away.  
Content  
Subject areas identified by respondents as being addressed by the ADT train-the-trainer 
program ranged from forestry to agronomic crops, to fruit and vegetable production; including, 
wheat, alfalfa, animal husbandry, bee keeping, apples, and poultry. Other topics taught included 
irrigation, watershed management, cold storage, contract writing, cooperatives, greenhouses, and 
veterinary medicine.  
 When asked about additional technical support that may be needed by the ADT team, the 
consensus was that much of the information was already available. Lieutenant Colonel Amos 
emphasized that their training had linked them to NGO organizations, many governmental 
organizations and other military units set up to support one another. These included such groups 
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as the USDA, USAID and the U.S. Department of State; all working together through Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams housed on U.S. bases. However, since U.S. agriculture personnel saw 
education as the most crucial function of an extension program to Afghans, they stressed 
extension education planning and delivery methods as critical subject areas.  
Process 
Learning Strategies: Barriers & Strengths  
The USDA agricultural adviser, Mr. Livingston, underscored the importance of training 
Afghan extension educators when he said: “Because Americans listen to American farmers, 
Afghans are going to listen to Afghan farmers. So, you get that. And I think you will see just a 
mushroom effect occur.”  
ADT personnel determined the best delivery for agricultural extension education would 
be sequential in nature. Sergeant Milner phrased it as, “Educating the farmers, extension agents, 
and hoping that they’ll also carry this educational training into the school systems.” He further 
stated the need to connect the extension agents to formal government educational programs. At 
the time, vocational programs and university programs existed, but they were controlled by a 
different ministry and had no incentive to cooperate with the MAIL-controlled extension system 
(Groninger, 2006). The ADT members saw their roles not only in the realm of teaching, but also 
facilitating cooperation among Afghan agriculture and education institutions; including, MAIL 
extension agents, schools and colleges, agricultural associations, and other related organizations. 
Specialist Kraft stated,  
If we can work more with them and bring them along with the different  
organizations we need, and help make those contacts and introductions, and if we have 
credibility with the organization that we introduce to a new extension agent, then 
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hopefully some of our credibility with roll over and then they’ll value that individual. So 
when we’re gone, the extension agents can help sustain all the groups. 
Respondents reported much of the training took place at DAIL compounds and at 
established demonstration farms. While they stated this was due to difficult travel through 
mountains, lack of infrastructure, and security threats; the greatest barrier for attendance at 
training sessions was, simply, farmers not being told of the opportunities. They emphasized 
communication, then, as a critical element for effective extension, indicating its conspicuous 
absence. In trying to work through the government office of the DAIL, the ADT personnel cited 
few or no announcements of events. “The DAILs never tried to put that issue out there,” stated 
Sergeant Milner. 
Since travel is difficult and costly, when people travel to receive training, they also expect 
to receive something of monetary value to offset their expenses. Dr. Granite indicated, “The price 
of gasoline is equivalent there to what it is here in the U.S., but a laborer can only expect to make 
maybe eight dollars a day (if he can find work). So they spend a considerable amount of income 
just to get to where they are going.” 
Methods of information transfer varied from one region to another. The Afghans liked the 
formal setting of a classroom and lecture, while American personnel emphasized experiential 
learning and demonstration. Dr. Granite pointed out that one Afghan farmer observing another 
was an especially effective method for transferring information. A farmer seemed to value 
information more if he took the information, almost surreptitiously, rather than being taught it.  
While associations and cooperatives were another venue that was sometimes effective for 
marketing, a more common and cultural entity identified by respondents was the shura, a small 
representative body that acted for a village or group of villages in the decision making process. 
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The Afghan people saw a shura as less corrupt and more efficient than the official government, 
and so farmers and support personnel alike especially preferred it where other governing entities 
functioned poorly.  
However, in some regions the governor (provincial) and sub-governor (district) positively 
influenced extension programs. Mr. Livingston, USDA agricultural advisor, indicated the DAIL 
and his line directors conducted most extension work. Lieutenant Colonel Amos reinforced the 
need for extension conducted through the DAIL in order to develop and build confidence in the 
governmental system. To illustrate this concept, he described a situation that stood in stark 
contrast by saying: 
The USDA rep in an adjacent province has done a contract and hired extension agents, 
and has 18 extension agents down there working for the USDA. But we’re in an 
argument with them because, in our mind, that’s not building the system. That needs to be 
run through the DAIL for us to be effective. We could go out and do the same thing here, 
but all we’re doing is cutting the DAIL out of the picture instead of pushing them to 
establish the government and the extension program in the government.  
 Technical Content 
 Lieutenant Colonel Amos and Sergeant Milner pointed out that the long-term goal for the 
U.S. personnel was to support Afghan extension agents so they could educate farmers and 
agricultural businesses. In so doing, they insisted we could get them to the point of sustaining 
themselves; they, in turn, could then move past self-sustainment and learn to market their goods. 
 Dr. Granite saw the function of U.S. personnel and coalition forces as providers of 
expertise in agriculture, providing or facilitating technical training to Afghan people who 
function as Afghan extension agents employed by the Afghan government. He explained this 
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would comprise a train-the-trainer program that would enable Afghan agriculture to be self-
sustainable and ongoing. U.S. personnel would provide access to technical content in every 
aspect of agriculture, as well as techniques in communications and information dissemination. 
 The training, which ADT personnel said they received from U.S. universities, provided 
technical information and “reach back” capabilities via Internet to the universities, libraries and 
industries in the United States. Both U.S. personnel and Afghan agents also had a considerable 
network within the country that included regional education institutions, USAID, USDA and 
many NGOs. 
 ADT personnel also emphasized providing trainers who had practical experience. 
Sergeant Milner stressed the need for agents to teach basic agricultural functions, training 
Afghan extension agents in such things as how to properly harvest crops, plant a nursery, prune 
trees, and harvest pine nuts. Adding to that list, Lieutenant Colonel Amos underscored the need 
for trainers knowledgeable about agricultural mechanics. He indicated that once a piece of 
machinery broke, it would be abandoned.   
Training Methods 
The U.S. personnel interviewed saw Afghan extension personnel as differing radically in 
terms of academic preparation. U.S. personnel sought to further Afghan extension agents’ 
training through the use of classroom lecture, demonstration and experiential learning at 
demonstration farms, and through modeling the information transfer techniques for extension 
agents during farmer training sessions. Thus, respondents stated a train-the-trainer approach was 
employed by U.S. personnel. 
The DAIL hired Afghan extension agents primarily, and a process of advertising 
positions, application, interview, and hiring resulted from a set of criteria. Mr. Livingston, USDA 
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agricultural advisor, acknowledged that hiring criteria of extension agents varied in each region, 
however. A degree of nepotism exists in some areas, but the ADT staff agreed that extension 
should nonetheless be conducted through the government. When asked if the extension agents 
had adequate support to do their jobs, Sergeant Milner indicated they did not have the equipment 
with which to teach farmers. In some cases, they did not have the basic office furniture to even 
set up an office, nor did they possess a vehicle by which to travel around the district to observe 
what actually was occurring on the farms and orchards.  
Security issues also determined where the extension agent located his base of operations. 
Respondents indicated the general population viewed Afghan extension agents as government 
representatives; they saw them as placing their lives, and the lives of their families, at risk. The 
following discussion on the topic illustrated the contradicting views on this issue of extension 
agent location: 
[If I were an Afghan extension agent] I might be the sub-governor of a district that’s an 
hour’s drive from here, but I’m not going to put my family in that same district that I’m a 
sub-governor in; because now I not only put myself in danger, I just put my family in 
danger. –Sergeant Milner 
Which I don’t agree with… When in the states, you have to live in the district that you’re 
an extension agent in. –Sergeant Smith 
It’s a different culture, too. Until they get good government security, then they’re going to 
continue to operate in that manner. –Sergeant Milner 
As security decreased, it was observed that training tended to transition from formal 
workshops with lectures and hands-on laboratory experience to impromptu demonstrations in a 
farmer’s field, or demonstrations in a village where small groups of people had congregated. In 
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cases of extremely bad security, respondents reported representatives from areas inaccessible to 
trainers traveled to more secure villages to receive training on behalf of their communities. They 
pointed out since the population often had low levels of literacy, and since landline telephones 
and postal services were non-existent in the country, radio experienced considerable success in 
broadcasting agricultural information. Communication, in general however, was a primary need. 
U.S. personnel saw telecommunication links between Afghan universities and the United States 
as an important resource that would enhance the training of Afghan extension agents. 
Materials currently used by the ADT included Power Point presentations using laptops, 
projectors and screens. They also employed blackboard and chalk lectures. Other venues for 
communicating agricultural information included the use of agricultural organizations or 
associations. Lieutenant Colonel Amos identified the beekeepers association as influencing the 
whole province, boasting over two hundred members. The Apple Growers Association also 
maintained a large membership, with Lieutenant Colonel Amos identifying apple trees as one of 
the largest fruit commodities in the region. Another agricultural organization useful to farmers 
included the Afghanistan Veterinary Association. 
In Khost and Paktya, most training took place on demonstration farms at the university, at 
schools and in district centers. In Paktika, Mr. Alvin, USAID development officer, pointed out 
Afghan National Police (ANP) maintained security so as to minimize the sense of a foreign 
presence. They had constructed a greenhouse and grape trellises there for training purposes. 
Target Populations for Agricultural Extension 
Extension agents targeted farmers of all ages, but ADT staff felt extension should also 
explore the use of youth programs similar to 4-H and FFA. Many farmers were actually in their 
teen years, but were taught with the older farmers. Mr. Alvin, USAID development officer, 
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recorded the ages of farmers who attended extension training programs as ranging from 16 to 60. 
ADT staff saw women as another important group to target, but cultural boundaries made contact 
with them difficult. Sergeant Smith specialized in women’s training, however, and sometimes 
assembled female training sessions in spite of barriers. 
Two Additional Theories 
 Through multiple visits by the researcher to the study site over two years time, analysis of 
existing documents, and the interviews conducted, the researchers sought to generate new theory 
regarding agricultural extension work in Afghanistan (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  Grounded in the 
data from the field (Cresswell, 1998), two theories surfaced which were then incorporated into 
the theoretical model of this study; namely, Security & Access and Provincial Diversity. 
Security & Access 
 Respondents agreed security issues acted as the primary driver of the type of extension 
delivery system employed. In the best cases, the Afghan extension agents could travel freely and 
deliver workshops without additional security considerations. However, U.S. personnel observed 
some Afghan extension agents feared for their lives and those of their families; thus, were unable 
to live in the districts where they worked. While they observed some Afghan agents stayed under 
the U.S. security umbrella, both professionally and off the clock, other Afghan agents operated 
similarly with Afghan security forces. Afghan farmers who participated in extension programs, 
on the other hand, were not threatened, according to the U.S. extension personnel interviewed. 
Provincial Diversity 
 Institutional Strength 
 Informants’ impressions of the Afghan government (GIRoA) also differed starkly among 
the provinces. In Khost, the provincial governor was seen by a U.S. informant to effectively 
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engage and support agriculture. In Paktya, corruption was formally and informally mentioned as 
an important force. In Paktika, GIRoA did very little in even the most basic government services. 
With the assent of insurgents, local people relied on non-government judges to settle disputes 
and dispense justice, reportedly preferring their prompt and relatively fair decisions to the 
purportedly slow and corrupt GIRoA judges.   
Agro-ecological Resources and Infrastructure 
 Respondents described local agricultural capacity and sophistication as highly diverse, 
but not necessarily reflecting the security situation. For example, Paktya had a thriving fruit 
export business with India and Pakistan, and sought further markets on the Arabian Peninsula. 
Elsewhere, most engaged in subsistence farming. Many agronomic farms in the central Khost 
province were very productive. Fodder corn production and widespread use of fertilizer was 
evident during August 2010.  
In eastern Paktika, respondents reported farm conditions varied considerably by district. 
Most areas there appeared to be particularly lacking in resources, even where irrigation water 
was available. In other areas, where irrigation systems remained non-functional, farmers lacked a 
means of licitly accumulating capital, and recent floods had destroyed already scarce fields. The 
shortage of available land and the loss of land due to floods presented a large concern in Paktika.
 Inconsistent infrastructure and scattered electricity production made farming and post- 
harvest considerations difficult. Water availability differed starkly despite strong influences of 
monsoonal rains in that extreme southeastern corner of the country. Irrigation infrastructure 
showed varied states of repair and rehabilitation. Most major and secondary roads remained 
vulnerable to insurgent attacks, and informants often referenced anti-government elements as 
problematic throughout the region, most prominently the Haqqani network. Smuggling of goods, 
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munitions and combatants between these provinces and adjacent tribally-controlled lands across 
the Pakistan border was a common activity among insurgents and others.    
A Paktika provincial government employee, reportedly interviewed by a respondent in 
eastern Paktika, was afraid to travel to the provincial capital due to safety concerns underscoring 
the functionally disjointed nature of the province. Furthermore, respondents reported GIRoA had 
a limited presence, even in the most secure district in eastern Paktika province. Kinetic warfare 
was commonplace within several districts in both provinces. Use of buried improvised explosive 
devices, suicide bombers, and insurgent forces using grenades and automatic rifles also presented 
considerable danger to personnel outside all but the most secure confines.  For U.S. bases, rocket 
attacks ranged from a regular occurrence, to rare or non-existent, depending on the location. 
Implications and Recommendations 
 Many countries emulate the agricultural extension education model developed in the 
United States.  Implications may be drawn from this study, which contribute to the further 
development of similar extension programs; thus, supporting the sustainability of agricultural 
systems in both Afghanistan and other countries with safety and security concerns. To ensure not 
only the establishment of the extension program, but also the sustainability of the program, the 
following recommendations based on the findings of this study and grouped according to its 
objectives are: 
1. How security and access influenced efforts in Afghan extension. 
a. Agricultural extension training should be located on demonstration farms. However, they 
should be established on smaller demonstration farms which are farmer-owned rather 
than on government-owned and managed demonstration farms.  
b. Future extension agents should be recruited from the districts in which they will serve.  
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c. U.S. personnel should train or facilitate training of Afghan extension agents; the 
extension agents should, in turn, teach farmers.  
2. The role provincial diversity played in Afghan extension. 
a. Afghan extension agents should network among themselves to encourage an 
interchange of ideas among professionals.  
b. Program planners should account for the unique needs and relative strengths and 
weaknesses of each district and province. 
3. How assessment uses industry needs to guide trainee preparation by identifying gaps in 
trainees’ skill levels. 
a. Establish the role of an extension agent as educator, rather than simply the provider of 
seeds, fertilizer and equipment.  
4. The content needed in Afghan extension to ensure all needed skills are imparted to both 
trainers and trainees. 
a. Conduct further assessment, obtaining feedback from both Afghan extension agents 
and farmers, in order to further improve content and processes in the current 
agricultural extension effort.  
5. The process components which would be effective in Afghan extension to accomplish 
information dissemination. 
a. In developing agricultural extension, the effort by U.S. personnel should be of very 
low intensity with long-term commitment; there is no substitute for time.  
b. Ensure the local and national governmental offices are directly involved in the 
establishment of the agricultural extension program.  
c. Avoid ineffective central planning by establishing a cooperative extension program; 
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including government, university and NGO collaboration - fostering local initiative. 
d. Engage young farmers and other youth through programs similar to 4-H and FFA in 
the United States, to receive agricultural extension education.  
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